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359 
CARDOZO’S FREUDIAN SLIPS 
Steven L. Winter* 
Those of us who teach appellate opinions for a living are 
indebted to the great stylists—Marshall, Holmes, Cardozo, and 
Jackson—whose prose rises above the mostly turgid judicial plain.1 
Cardozo could write.  But, his was “an alien grace.”2  Cardozo—to 
invoke his own typology of judicial styles3—was by turns magisterial, 
laconic, refined, precious, and persuasive.  He could turn a phrase, but 
his prose was often overwrought.  At his aphoristic best, he rivaled 
Holmes.  At his worst, Cardozo could obscure thought “[b]ehind a 
cloud of words.”4  
Judge Posner notes that there are “two diametrically opposed” 
views of Cardozo’s style—some praising it as terse and lucid and 
others criticizing it as fancy and overly precious.5  Posner splits the 
difference, as it were: “The former style dominates in his judicial 
opinions; the latter is far more marked (though not dominant) in his 
nonjudicial writings.”6   There is some truth in this assessment.  Several 
of Cardozo’s best-known opinions—in particular, MacPherson v. 
Buick Motor Co.,7 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,8 Wood v. Lucy, 
 
*Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University Law 
School. I am grateful to Jeremy Paul and Mark Johnson for their comments. 
1 Holmes complained in a letter to Pollack that “our reports were so dull because we had 
the notion that judicial dignity required solemn fluffy speech.” HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: 
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, 132 
(Mark de Wolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961). 
2 Anon. Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625, 630 
(1943) (written by Jerome Frank). Frank complained that Cardozo often wrote as if “he had 
used a private time-machine to transport himself back into 18th Century England.” Id. at 631. 
3 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 10 
(1931). 
4 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 350 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
5 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 21-22 (1990). 
6 Id. at 22. 
7 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
8 220 N.Y. 259 (1917). 
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Lady Duff-Gordon,9 and Hynes v. N.Y. Central R.R.10—are models of 
clear, edifying writing.  In contrast, the famous “how trackless was the 
ocean” passage from The Nature of the Judicial Process is 
characterized by over-extended and mixed metaphors, literary 
allusion, and ornate prose.11  Tellingly, Posner has to first edit the 
excess from the passage before he can pronounce it a “gem.”12  
Posner’s generalization identifying different styles with 
different genres is not borne out by the evidence.  Some of Cardozo’s 
best epigrams appear in his extrajudicial writings.  Consider three of 
my favorites.  
• “They do things better with logarithms. . . , yet 
unwritten is my table of logarithms, the index of 
the power to which a precedent must be raised 
to produce the formula of justice.”13 
 
• “Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will 
some day become fixed law. Law preserves the 
moulds, which have taken form and shape from 
life.”14 
 
• “There is an accuracy that defeats itself by the 
over-emphasis of details.”15 
These lines exhibit a flow and grace that enhance rather than defeat 
their clarity.  They are pithy, punchy, profound, and nearly as good as 
the classic criticism in People v. Defore:16  “The criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”17  
Conversely, Cardozo’s judicial prose was often overworked. 
Consider his opinion in Welch v. Helvering.18  After the family grain 
business had declared bankruptcy, Welch became a purchaser for 
 
9 222 N.Y. 88 (1917). 
10 231 N.Y. 229 (1921). 
11 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-67 (1921). 
12 POSNER, supra note 5, at 23. 
13 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 1-2 (1928). 
14 NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 64. 
15 LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 7. 
16 242 N.Y. 13 (1926). 
17 Id. at 21.  
18 290 U.S. 111 (1933). 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 1, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/22
2018 CARDOZO’S FREUDIAN SLIPS 361 
another grain company.  Over five successive years, Welch paid off 
the bankrupt company’s debts and claimed the payments as business 
deductions.  The Commissioner recognized that these payments served 
the bona fide business purpose of establishing good will with Welch’s 
former customers.  He nevertheless disallowed them, analogizing them 
to capital investments which are nondeductible.  Cardozo also assumed 
that the payments to the bankrupt’s former creditors were necessary to 
establish Welch in his new business.  He concluded, however, that            
they were not “ordinary.”19   Cardozo admitted that the line between a 
capital investment and an ordinary business expense is unclear:  
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, 
the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of 
kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that 
will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by 
the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. 
Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the 
riddle.20  
My tax professor practically snickered at this last line.  We students 
made a running joke of it. 
It is, of course, unexceptional to say that a legal question is a 
matter of degree.  But, by what gauge are we to take its measure? 
Cardozo does not say.  He suggests that the law must draw on cultural 
“norms of conduct” in distinguishing between ordinary and 
extraordinary expenses.21  Fair enough.  But, what factors should one 
consider?  Should it matter that Welch acted on advice of three 
different bankers?22  Welch is an example of what Posner identifies as 
a failure by Cardozo “to follow through on the pragmatic program by 
candidly displaying and analyzing the practical considerations bearing 
 
19 Id. at 113-14. 
20 Id. at 114-15. 
21 Id. at 114. See also text accompanying supra note 14. Presumedly, this is what he means 
when he says—in proto-Wittgensteinian fashion—that the standard is “a way of life.” Cf. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 241, 88e (G. Anscombe trans., 
1953) (“It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they 
use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.”). 
22 Joel S. Newman, The Story of Welch: The Use (and Misuse) of the ‘Ordinary and 
Necessary’ Test for the Deductibility of Business Expenses, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH 
LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 197, 203 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
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on decision.”23  But it is more than that; it is a mystification.  “Life in 
all its fullness” obscures rather than clarifies the analysis.24 
Cardozo’s judicial pronouncements were often opaque in just 
this way—not arbitrarily, but strategically.  He admitted as much in his 
1925 ALI address: “Those of us whose lives have been spent on the 
bench or at the bar have learned caution and reticence, perhaps even in 
excess.  We know the value of the veiled phrase, the blurred edge, the 
uncertain line.”25  Cardozo was acutely aware that metaphors in law 
could be used to “enslave” rather than “liberate” thought.26  He knew, 
too, that the layperson often experienced such pronouncements as “a 
mystifying cloud of words.”27  Yet, he frequently exploited those 
insights in constructing his opinions.  I examine several examples of 
his use of metaphor to obscure his shortcomings of reason.  My claim 
is that when Cardozo waxes poetic it is not an accident, but a 
parapraxis or Freudian slip that signals a knowing weakness in his 
argument.  Although it is hard to imagine Cardozo as a poker player, 
he certainly would have been a bad one.  Metaphor is his “tell.” 
A classic instance is Cardozo’s much cited opinion for the 
Court in Gully v. First National Bank,28 a suit to collect a state tax from 
a federally chartered bank.  The bank removed the case to federal court 
on the ground that the levy was possible only because of a federal 
statute waiving what would otherwise have been a constitutional 
immunity.29  There was, thus, a necessary federal ingredient in the 
 
23 POSNER, supra note 5, at 137.  
24 Newman, supra note 22 at 208, concludes that Cardozo “was wrong on the personal 
versus business issue, and he was wrong on the ordinary versus bizarre issue. As to ordinary 
versus capital, he was right, but his opinion gave us very little guidance.” 
25 Judge Cardozo’s Address at Third Annual Meeting, American Law Institute, 11 A.B.A.J. 
294, 296 (1925). 
26 See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y 84, 94 (1926) (“Metaphors in law are to be 
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”). 
It is not, of course, true that metaphors usually deceive; that is a rationalist prejudice. For 
extended examination of a legal metaphor that is superior to more conventional legal 
formulations, see Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
323 (1992). For further examples of the use of metaphors to clarify analysis, see infra notes 
42-45 and accompanying text. 
27 See LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 3, at 100 (“A metaphor, however, is, to say the 
least, a shifting test whereby to measure degrees of guilt that mean the difference between life 
and death. . . . I have no objection to giving [the jury] this dispensing power, but it should be 
given to them directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words.”).  
28 299 U.S. 109 (1936). Lexis shows that Gully has been cited in 2643 cases. 
29 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 
22 U.S. 738 (1824). 
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plaintiff’s case.  Under Osborn v. Bank of the United States,30 this 
would have been enough to satisfy federal question jurisdiction. 
Cardozo held against jurisdiction on the ground that the federal 
element was too remote.  Here, again, Cardozo’s attempt to explain his 
intuition shed more heat than light.  The passage is worth quoting at 
length: 
What is needed is something of that common-sense 
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic 
situations which characterizes the law in its treatment 
of problems of causation. One could carry the search 
for causes backward almost without end. . . . Instead, 
there has been a selective process which picks the 
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones 
aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the search 
for the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far 
enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to 
have their source or their operative limits in the 
provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution 
itself, with its circumambient restrictions upon 
legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the 
courts have formulated the distinction between 
controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, 
between disputes that are necessary and those that are 
merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put 
that compass by.31 
How are we to read that compass?  The distinction between what is 
basic and what is collateral is left deliberately unformulated; yet, it too 
is a matter of degree and not of kind.  Cardozo offers no principle, no 
metric, no test.32 (Just as in Welch, he provided neither a workable 
concept nor, even, a verbal formula.)  The distinction between what is 
 
30 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823 (“when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is 
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of 
Congress to give . . . jurisdiction of that cause.”). But see Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 
(1912); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
31 Gully, 299 U.S. at 117-18. 
32 He did suggest a second, more practical distinction between “disputes that are necessary 
and those that are merely possible,” id. at 118, but this was the very distinction rejected by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823-25, and its companion case, Bank of the 
United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904 (1824) (suit on a promissory note 
assigned to the Bank). 
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basic and what is collateral is no more helpful than the discredited 
distinction between direct and indirect effects in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.33  We are meant to get lost in the maze of Cardozo’s 
metaphors and accept his resolution of the question.  (Trackless seas, 
indeed.)  It should come as no surprise that, when in Franchise Tax 
Board 34   Justice Brennan quotes this passage from Gully, it is to 
render a judgment “for reasons involving perhaps more history than 
logic.”35 
Gully is paradigmatic.  Cardozo often turned to metaphors of 
causation to divert attention from the absence of argument or analysis. 
In Schechter Poultry v. United States,36 Cardozo concurred with the 
majority in striking down wages-and-hours regulations pursuant to the 
National Industry Recovery Act as outside Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce.   He explained his conclusion as follows: 
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local 
in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim 
is communicated perceptibly, though minutely, to 
recording instruments at the center. A society such as 
ours “is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors 
throughout its territory; the only question is of their 
size.” Per Learned Hand, J., in the court below. The law 
is not indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities 
local in their immediacy do not become interstate and 
national because of distant repercussions. What is near 
and what is distant may at times be uncertain. . . . There 
is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment 
here. To find immediacy or directness here is to find it 
almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be 
isolated to the exclusion of the forces that oppose and 
 
33 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 
301 U.S. 1, 41 (1938); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). See also United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 572-73 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the 
inconsistencies that arose when the New Deal Court applied “the abandoned abstract 
distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce”).  
34 463 U.S. 1 (1983).  
35 Id. at 4. The “kaleidoscopic situations” line—which, according to Lexis, is quoted in 134 
cases in total—appears in a later passage of Franchise Tax Board. Id. at 20-21. 
36 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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counteract them, there will be an end to our federal 
system.37 
The passage is elaborate in its imagery, if opaque in meaning. 
Although Professor Currie praised the “accustomed elegance” of the 
final line, he saw Cardozo’s opinion as little more than a conclusion 
“without elaboration.”38  Rather, he read the “candid imprecision of 
Cardozo’s approach” as an admission of the subjective nature of the 
inquiry.39  “As always,” he observed, “it was easier to declare there 
were limits than to explain why the particular case lay beyond them.”40 
If the passage seems cogent, it is because Cardozo artfully 
structures it around a series of center-periphery metaphors: motion at 
the outer rim being communicated to recording instruments at the 
center; tremors spreading though the land with distant repercussions; 
penumbras of uncertainty; a wheel whose balance must not be 
disturbed.  But close examination reveals that the metaphors do not 
cohere.  For one thing, Cardozo reverses vector without warning or 
discernable logic.  He starts with the distinction between what is 
national and what is local.  But, when he refers to motion at the outer 
rim being communicated to recording instruments at the center, he is 
saying that local activities at the periphery are registering their effect 
on the national economy as monitored in Washington.  In the next 
sentences, he reverses direction yet again.  Now he speaks of tremors 
radiating outward—that is, of local activities having distant 
repercussions on the over-all economy.  When we reach the concluding 
sentence—“If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of 
the forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our 
federal system”41—we are left to wonder at the mappings.  Which are 
the centripetal forces and which the counteracting forces? Is the federal 
government (or interstate commerce) the rim of the wheel or its hub?42 
 
37 Id. at 554.  
38 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 
1888-1986, 223 (1990). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 554.  
42 Here is a sentence-by-sentence breakdown of the vectors and semantics: 
S1 - national to local 
S2 - periphery to center - local to national 
S3 - center to periphery - local to national (vector reversed) 
S4 - none 
S5 - center to periphery - local to national 
7
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The overall import of the final sentence remains clear: The 
federal system is like a finely tuned wheel that will break if its balance 
of forces is unsettled.  It is a striking image that arrests our attention. 
But, one wonders, how is interstate commerce like a wheel?  What, 
precisely, is the balance that would be disturbed?  Is Cardozo saying 
that if we uphold the wages-and-hours regulations, the wheel will 
break because we will be reinforcing—isolating—the centripetal, 
national forces to the exclusion of local forces (the actions of local 
authorities or the market) necessary to counteract them?  That would 
be consistent with the vector of the first sentence of the passage, which 
runs from national to local.  The verb “isolate” is awkward on this 
reading, though perhaps not for Cardozo’s archaic style; a better 
rendering might be “if we detach the centripetal forces from those 
counterbalancing them, the wheel will fly apart.”  Maybe the 
centripetal forces are the local economic activities whose effects are 
being monitored at the center.  If so, the verb makes a bit more sense: 
It would be the causal effects of the local activities that are being 
isolated by the legal analysis.  On this reading, Cardozo would be 
saying that if we pick out (isolate) the effects of the peripheral (that is, 
local) actions on the national economy to find causation and uphold 
the statute, then the federal system will break down.  But what, then, 
are the countervailing national forces he is referring to?  The wheel 
metaphor is memorable, but it is cryptic.  It obscures the basis of 
Cardozo’s judgment, rather than clarifying it. 
 A year later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,43 Cardozo dissented 
from the Court’s decision striking down the provisions of the 
Bituminous Coal Act setting minimum and maximum prices.44 
Invoking his Schechter Poultry concurrence, he observed: 
Sometimes it is said that the relation must be “direct” 
to bring that power into play. In many circumstances 
such a description will be sufficiently precise to meet 
the needs of the occasion. But a great principle of 
constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive 
statement in an adjective. The underlying thought is 
 
S6 - center to periphery - local to national 
S7 - center to periphery - light = clarity to shadow 
S8 - center to periphery - local actions to national effect                                                                                    
S9 - periphery to center - presumedly, national to local but referents unclear 
43 298 U.S. 238 (1936).  
44 Id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  
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merely this, that “the law is not indifferent to 
considerations of degree. . . .” It cannot be indifferent 
to them without an expansion of the commerce clause 
that would absorb or imperil the reserved powers of the 
states. At times, as in the case cited, the waves of 
causation will have radiated so far that their undulatory 
motion, if discernible at all, will be too faint or obscure, 
too broken by cross-currents, to be heeded by the 
law. . . . The relation may be tenuous or the opposite 
according to the facts. Always the setting of the facts is 
to be viewed if one would know the closeness of the tie. 
Perhaps, if one group of adjectives is to be chosen in 
preference to another, “intimate” and “remote” will be 
found to be as good as any.45 
Here, the center-periphery metaphor is clear: The centrifugal forces 
are waves of causation undulating outward whose effects on interstate 
commerce must be decoded.  (In this instantiation of the center-
periphery metaphor, the counteracting forces are identified; they are 
the crosscurrents of other, national economic factors affecting the 
regulated industry.)  Cardozo finds the national effects sufficiently 
significant in this case; but, once again, he fails to tell us why.  Instead, 
he suggests that the discredited distinction between direct and indirect 
effects on commerce might be improved by substituting the terms 
“intimate” and “remote.”  But he self-consciously places these words 
in scare quotes, sending a clear signal that he knows these terms are no 
more helpful. 
Notice three things about Cardozo’s use of metaphors of 
causation: First, there is a subtle shift in the metaphors he employs. 
Causation is variously a kaleidoscope, a web, a wheel, or a series of 
radiating tremors or waves.  Second, there is a cognitive and linguistic 
consistency to these metaphors; all of them are imagistically related by 
the figure of a circle or the center-periphery schema.  Third, each of 
these different metaphors for causation has different entailments.  A 
kaleidoscope mesmerizes; a web ensnares; a tremor disturbs or 
 
45 Id. at 327-28 (quoting Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 554). The point of this passage, 
common to Holmes and Cardozo, is a rejection of the formalist faith in distinctions and a 
realist plea of necessity—that is, we know these distinctions do not work but we have to keep 
the system functioning. See STEVEN L. WINTER. A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE & 
MIND 295-97 (2001). But, this strategy comes with costs to law’s legitimacy, id. at 296-97, 
and is in fact needlessly imprecise. See id. at 186-222. 
9
Winter: Cardozo’s Freudian Slips
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
368 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
destroys; a wave buoys, pushes, or engulfs; a wheel gets one where 
one wants to go.  
The different metaphors also denote different models or 
concepts of causation.  A kaleidoscope is a tube containing colored 
glass and mirrors that, when rotated, creates endlessly varying 
symmetrical patterns.  The implication is that the ever-changing 
situations of life cannot be reduced to neat causal stories.  Similarly, a 
web is an intricate structure of filaments in complex tension with one 
another; one cannot extract a single strand without destroying the 
entire structure.  Thus, to pick the substantial causes from the web and 
lay the other ones aside is to falsify the causation issue.  Analogously, 
a wheel is a powerful machine that works because of the balance 
among its components.  It is a system of forces, and not a 
unidirectional, linear force like a tremor or a wave.  As such, it is not 
at all like the legal concept of causation.  But it is an apt metaphor for 
a system like federalism that is composed of complementary 
interacting forces.46  
The choice of metaphor, in other words, should matter for how 
one thinks about an issue such as federalism or causation.  It does not 
for Cardozo because, in these passages, he is not concerned with the 
substantive issue.  He is interested, rather, in turning a phrase that will 
veil the blurred edge of his reasoning.  The confusion of revolving 
colors of the kaleidoscope telegraphs exactly what Cardozo is up to in 
Gully.  In effect, he is saying: “We cannot really know when the federal 
ingredient is enough of a federal ingredient, and I cannot tell you how 
we draw that line.  Just trust me, and I will pick it out of the web.”  
On the other hand, the “web of causation” metaphor does not 
appear in Schechter where it would actually be appropriate.  After all, 
what is a market if not a web of causation?  A market is a large 
polycentric system; if you pull on a strand in one part of the system it 
will affect what goes on elsewhere.  As Lon Fuller observes: “A rise 
 
46 The proper tension of a wheel depends on the materials, the design (wheels with gears 
attached are asymmetrical), and the balance among all of the components. The contemporary 
constitutional standards for federalism as in Lopez and National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) are categorical and rigid. 
The better approach is found in the system-focused logic of cases such as Garcia v. San 
Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1984), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824). 
See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). See 
also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
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in the price of aluminum may affect in varying degrees the demand for, 
and therefore the proper price of, thirty kinds of steel, twenty kinds of 
plastics, an infinitude of woods, other metals, etc.”47  When Cardozo 
says that to “find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost 
everywhere,”48 he has the right insight but the wrong conclusion. 
Because markets are a like a web, to find interstate commerce here is 
to find it everywhere—which is precisely what the Court ultimately 
recognized in Wickard.49  
Cardozo is not interested in causation, but in persuasion.  His 
uses of metaphor are not substantive, but strategic.  He is sophisticated 
in his facility, but manipulative in his intent.  Though his rhetorical 
skill is estimable, his metaphors supplant what should be the work of 
argument and analysis.  A rhetorician of Cardozo’s power could use 
metaphor to explain what he is doing and why.  That, however, is not 
Cardozo’s game. 
No symposium on Cardozo is complete without discussion of 
his opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company.50  While 
 
47 Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395 (1978). 
48 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 554.  
49 “Once an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in the 
Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding 
the activity in question to be ‘production’ nor can consideration of its economic effects be 
foreclosed by calling them ‘indirect.’” Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25.  
  At the conference, the question arose whether the decisions in Lopez and Sibelius are 
consistent with the Court’s rationale in Wickard. Despite the later Courts’ characterizations, 
they are not. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 638 (the Gun Free School Zone Act “is a criminal 
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise”), and Sibelius, 567 U.S. at 550 (“power to regulate commerce presupposes the 
existence of commercial activity to be regulated”), with Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (“even if 
appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce”) (emphasis added). The key point is that from an economic perspective 
none of these legalistic distinctions—between local and national, direct and indirect, 
commerce and not-commerce, action and inaction—make any sense. 
Was Filburn’s cultivation of wheat in excess of the quota “action” or 
“inaction”? In one sense, it was action—i.e., the forbidden planting and 
harvesting of wheat. From another perspective, it was inaction—i.e., a 
failure to go into the market to buy wheat. Did Filburn’s cultivation of 
wheat for home use represent a decrease in the demand (thus, depressing 
prices) or an increase in the supply of wheat available for consumption 
(thus, depressing prices)? The answer to each of these questions is “both” 
and “it doesn’t matter because the effect is precisely the same.”  
Steven L. Winter, When Things Went Terribly, Terribly Wrong Part II, 24-27 (2014) (Jotwell 
5th Anniversary Conference: Legal Scholarship We Like and Why It Matters), available online 
at http://jotwell.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ Winter-Terribly-Wrong-II-final.pdf. 
50 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). 
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Palsgraf is not an example of his florid use of metaphor as in the cases 
we have considered, we can see these same kinds of Freudian slips, 
parapraxes, and tells that signal when he is up to something. 
In Palsgraf, Cardozo sought to obviate the question of 
proximate cause by focusing instead on the antecedent legal question 
whether there was a duty owed to the plaintiff.51  Liability turns on 
duty, and duty is determined by foreseeability.  But that is a word he 
never uses.  The closest he comes is in the final sentences when he 
allows that liability for “an unforeseeable invasion of an interest of 
another order” of the same person might present a different question.52 
Otherwise, Cardozo uses no form of the word “foreseeable.”53   
Instead, he talks about “the eye of vigilance.”  He goes metaphoric on 
us.  It is the “eye of ordinary vigilance;” it is the “eye of reasonable 
vigilance;” but, it is always “the eye of vigilance.”54  (I envision the 
eye atop a pyramid that is on the back of the dollar bill—the “eye of 
vigilance.”) That is the first tell: Cardozo’s unaccountably 
overwrought phrase telegraphs that something is about happen. 
And, something is about to happen.  For a judge known for his 
eloquence, Cardozo is surprisingly tongue-tied in Palsgraf.  In holding 
that there was no negligence to the plaintiff, he explains: 
If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary 
vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to 
outward seeming, with reference to her, did not take to 
itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a 
wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of 
bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else.55 
 
51 Id. at 346 (“The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before 
us. The question of liability is always anterior to the question of the measure of the 
consequences that go with liability.”). Whether he succeeded is an open question. William L. 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953) (“Subsequent decisions, even when 
they cite Palsgraf, have remained in a state of disagreement and confusion, and the problem 
presented cannot be said by any means to be settled and disposed of.”). For a more recent 
survey of Palsgraf’s legacy that reaches a similar conclusion, see W. Jonathan Cardi, The 
Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873 (2011). 
52 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 347.  
53 In MacPherson, in contrast, he uses the word “foreseen” six times. MacPherson, 217 
N.Y. at 385 (“Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury.”); id. at 
390 (twice); id. at 392; and id. at 394 (twice). 
54 All together, he uses the phrase four times. Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 342, 343, 344. 
“Vigilance” appears three times in MacPherson, always in conjunction with “duty” and never 
“eye.” MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 385, 389, 394. 
55 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 342. 
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That does not sound like the Cardozo we know.  Why is he suddenly 
so tongue-tied? 
Cardozo is signaling—perhaps deliberately, but I assume 
unconsciously—that he is playing fast-and-loose with us.  First, he is 
playing fast-and-loose with his mischaracterization of the facts. 
Cardozo presents the facts in the most bloodless, most abstract way 
possible.  As Judge Noonan has noted, we learn nothing from the 
opinions56 about Mrs. Palsgraf’s age, her marital status, her 
employment, how many children she had, whether they were present, 
what her injuries were or how much the jury awarded.57   Most notably, 
Cardozo says that the plaintiff was “standing far away” next to scales 
“at the other end of the platform many feet away,”58 though the record 
was in fact silent on the question.59  This makes her injuries from the 
falling scale seem like a freak accident, possibly a fabrication.  In 
Prosser’s words, we feel the case was rightly decided because the claim 
was “too preposterous, . . . too improbable, too fantastic.”60  In fact, 
however, Mrs. Palsgraf and the scale stood scarcely ten feet from the 
explosion.61  Posner brands Cardozo’s mistreatment of the facts 
“outright fictionalizing.”62  Equally important are the things Cardozo 
does not tell us.  The New York Times reported the incident in a front-
page story.  The explosion was so powerful that it was heard several 
blocks away: 
 
56 I say “opinions,” in the plural, because the same is true of Andrews’s dissent. 
57 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, 
AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 113 (1976). Posner describes Cardozo’s statement of 
the facts as “elliptical,” “slanted,” “economical,” and “skeletal.” It “strips away all extraneous 
details, . . . and perhaps some essential facts as well” and “enables the reader to grasp . . . so 
much of the situation as Cardozo wants the reader to grasp.” POSNER, supra note 5, at 38, 42. 
58 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 341. 
59 Id. at 356 (Andrews, J., dissenting); Prosser, supra note 51, at 3 n.10; POSNER, supra note 
5, at 34. Cardozo also uses a series of hypotheticals to create the impression that Mrs. Palsgraf 
was at the far end of the platform. See Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 342 (a hypothetical about “a 
passenger at the other end of the platform”); id. at 343 (another about a person who is injured 
while “standing at the outer fringe” of a crowd). 
60 Prosser, supra note 51, at 27; see POSNER, supra note 5, at 36 (Cardozo makes “the 
collapse of the scale seem freakish”). 
61 “Bomb Blast Injures 13 In Station Crowd: Package of Fireworks Explodes in Beach 
Bound Throng in East New York,” The New York Times 1 (August 25, 1924) (hereinafter 
“Bomb Blast”), available online at: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1 
924/08/25/issue.html. Since the tenor of the Times article is to render the events as 
dramatically as possible, the report on the position of the scale as “more than ten feet away” 
(not a dozen or fifteen feet away) can be assumed reliable. 
62 POSNER, supra note 5, at 47. 
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There was a terrific roar, followed by several milder 
explosions, and a short-lived pyrotechnic display. The 
car nearest the explosion rocked and the windows 
crashed. Pieces of the big salute bomb shot up to the 
platform and hit persons nearby. The force of the 
detonation also ripped away some of the platform and 
overthrew a penny weighing machine more than 10 feet 
away. Its glass was smashed and its mechanism 
wrecked.63 
Nor does Cardozo tell us that thirteen people were injured.  Most were 
treated on the scene: six for abrasions, contusions, and lacerations; four 
for minor burns; two—including Mrs. Palsgraf—for shock.  Three of 
the injured were taken to the hospital for diagnosis, but later 
discharged.64 
Both the Times report and the opinions in Palsgraf suggest that 
the force of the explosion caused the scale to fall.  Prosser reports, 
however, that there was an interval of seconds between the explosion 
and the breaking of the scale.65  After studying the record, Prosser 
ultimately concluded that the “event could not possibly have 
happened” as described in the opinions.66  (Given the Times report, 
that is a serious understatement.)  Most likely, the scale was knocked 
over by the stampede of panicked passengers.67 
Do these facts change the case?  If one agrees with Cardozo’s 
atomized understanding of duty,68 the case should come out the same 
way.  Nevertheless, the severity of the actual incident changes how we 
understand the case in at least four ways.  First, it tests the limit of 
Palsgraf’s stark principle.  Under Cardozo’s atomized logic, the 
explosion could have killed one or more of the passengers and there 
would still be no liability.  Second, on the actual facts, the injury was, 
 
63 Bomb Blast, supra note 61, at 1. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 33-35. 
64 Bomb Blast, supra note 61, at 1. 
65 Prosser, supra note 51, at 3 n.9. 
66 NOONAN, supra note 57, at 119 (quoting from the 1962 edition of Prosser’s Torts 
casebook). 
67 Prosser, supra note 51, at 3 n.9. 
68 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 343-44 (“What the plaintiff must show is ‘a wrong’ to herself; i.e., 
a violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct ‘wrongful’ 
because unsocial, but not ‘a wrong’ to any one.”). As I have argued elsewhere, Palsgraf can 
be viewed as a standing case (and many standing cases are equally proximate cause cases). 
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 1391, 1475-78 (1988). 
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if nothing else, proximate.  “Always the setting of the facts is to be 
viewed if one would know the closeness of the tie.”69  Third, Cardozo 
loads the dice in his favor by making the case seem, in Prosser’s word, 
“preposterous.”  But, with thirteen injured and extensive damage to the 
platform, the entire scenario—including Mrs. Palsgraf’s shock and 
post-traumatic muteness—becomes eminently believable.  Fourth, 
Cardozo presents the case in a “cavalier and unreliable” manner as if 
“no reasonable man could find for plaintiff.”70  But, there was a jury 
verdict in this case.  Ordinarily, an appellate court accepts as true the 
account of the facts that is most consistent with the jury’s verdict.  
Cardozo, however, has already told us that he does this kind of 
thing.  Earlier, I quoted the line in Law and Literature where he said: 
“There is an accuracy that defeats itself by the over-emphasis of 
details.”71  But, in the very next sentence he goes on to confide: “I often 
say that one must permit oneself, and that quite advisedly and 
deliberately, a certain margin of misstatement.”72  He has told us that 
he misstates facts from time-to-time when it suits his purposes.  Here 
he makes the case easy for his desired rule by presenting a highly 
abstracted, partial, and partly fictionalized set of facts. 
Second, there is a misuse of analogy in Palsgraf.   Interestingly, 
it is telegraphed with a familiar image: “A different conclusion will 
involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of contradictions.”73  This is 
another parapraxis, for Cardozo wants us to be lost in the maze.  Thus, 
he gives us the following hypothetical: 
A guard stumbles over a package which has been left 
upon a platform. It seems to be a bundle of newspapers. 
It turns out to be a can of dynamite. To the eye of 
ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, 
which may be kicked or trod on with impunity. Is a 
passenger at the other end of the platform protected by 
the law against the unsuspected hazard concealed 
beneath the waste?74 
 
69 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 328 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
70 Prosser, supra note 51, at 31; Michael D. Green & Ashley DiMuzio, Cardozo and the 
Civil Jury, 34 TOURO L. REV. 183 (2018).  
71 Law and Literature, supra note 3, at 7.  
72 Law and Literature, supra note 3, at 7. 
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This sounds a lot like Palsgraf, but it is not.  It is the same newspaper 
bundle with explosives, just a slightly different set.  The passenger is 
once again situated much further away from the explosion than Mrs. 
Palsgraf actually was.  But what is missing from this hypothetical is 
negligence to anyone.  In Palsgraf, the conductor is pushing a man 
onto a moving train—something they do not do anymore because it is 
much too dangerous (and for entirely foreseeable reasons).  In this 
hypothetical, there is no negligence to anyone; there is just a piece of 
newspaper on the floor which “may be kicked or trod on with 
impunity.”75  Cardozo offers us a misanalogy that is as far from the 
issue in Palsgraf as his statement of the facts is from what actually 
transpired on that Long Island Railroad platform on that August 
morning. 
Third, and finally, there is Cardozo’s line: “[R]isk imports 
relation.”76  It is a great line.  But what does it mean?  Jerome Frank 
complained that Cardozo wrote as if he had used a private time 
machine to go back to 18th Century England to learn English.77  In its 
archaic sense, “import” means “to have as its signification; to carry               
the meaning of; to signify.”78  In context, it is clear that this is how 
Cardozo is in fact using the term: “The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to 
another or to others within the range of apprehension.”79 
But the phrase “risk imports relation” is ambiguous and can be 
understood in ways Cardozo did not intend.  Risk implies relation and, 
as Prosser says, “our ideas of relations change.”80  Suppose I am a 
manufacturer who makes a plastic bottle using a carcinogenic 
ingredient that puts the end consumers at risk.  In that case, the law 
will imply an obligation.  Again, as Prosser says (in Legal Realist 
fashion): “There is a duty if the court says there is a duty.”81  On this 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 344. 
77 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
78 Oxford English Dictionary Online, I.1.b., http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/ 
view/Entry/92550?rskey= EPZcnM&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid 
79 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 344. 
80 Prosser, supra note 51, at 13. 
81 Prosser, supra note 51, at 15. Cf. MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 391 (“The principle that the 
danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle do change. 
They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.”). In the 
paragraph that follows the “risk imports relation” discussion in Palsgraf, Cardozo provides a 
remarkably formalistic account of the development of the tort of negligence. Palsgraf, 217 
N.Y. at 345-46 (“Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and 
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view, the phrase “risk imports relation” has yet another unintended 
meaning: Risk introduces relation; it brings relation with it.  The 
holding of MacPherson, after all, is that the manufacturer has a duty 
to the people it has endangered regardless of privity.  One might 
respond that, in such cases, risk to the end consumer is foreseeable.82 
Except that it was not foreseeable until MacPherson said that it was. 
Thus, even Cardozo concedes in Palsgraf that: “Some acts, such as 
shooting, are so imminently dangerous to anyone who may come 
within reach of the missile however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty 
of prevision not far from that of an insurer.”83  Maybe pushing a person 
on a crowded platform onto a moving train is one of those cases. 
Maybe Mrs. Palsgraf’s status as a paying passenger on the Long Island 
Railroad is one of those relations carrying with it a higher standard of 
duty.84  Ultimately, it is a question of policy.85  Yet, in Palsgraf, policy 
is the one thing that Cardozo never addresses.  
Cardozo is justly famous for his insistence in The Nature of the 
Judicial Process that: “The final cause of law is the welfare of 
society.”86   We see that Cardozo in MacPherson and Hynes; he seems 
hidden in Welch, Gully, and Schechter Poultry; he is conspicuously 
absent from Palsgraf.  It is precisely in these latter cases that Cardozo 
the master rhetorician emerges.  And, make no mistake, Cardozo is a 
master.  He is like the duo Penn & Teller, who first explain to the 
audience how the standard magic trick works only to perform it in a 
way that nevertheless surprises.  Cardozo first tells us that he misstates 
the facts, that metaphor can be used to enslave thought, that he knows 
“the value of the veiled phrase, the blurred edge, the uncertain line”87 
and that we must, therefore, be careful not to get lost in a maze of 
 
the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right.”). Prosser offers a more realist 
account of the development of the concept of duty. Prosser, supra note 51, at 12-15 (“Does 
the railroad, then, owe a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf not to injure her in this way? Why, yes, if the 
court finds that it does. There is no other answer.”).  
82 MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 390-91. 
83 Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 344. 
84 Prosser, supra note 51, at 7 (“From the moment that she bought her ticket the defendant 
did in fact owe her a duty of the highest care, one of the most stringent known to the law.”); 
accord POSNER, supra note 5, at 39. 
85 See NOONAN, supra note 57, at 136-38 (“Was a form of transportation which was known 
to kill several thousand persons a year and to injure many thousands more to be treated as 
responsible for the injuries it generated only when its employees could reasonably have 
foreseen the particular persons they might injure?”). 
86 NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 66. 
87 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
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confusion.  And then he does just that: He misstates the facts, uses 
metaphor to mislead the reader, concatenates divergent images that do 
not fit each other or the facts, and leads us through a maze of examples 
designed to befuddle.  But, Cardozo is a master magician: First, he tells 
us what the trick is going to be; then, he does the trick; and then we are 
delighted by the sleight of hand and applaud. 
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